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Abstract: Over the past decade, several environmental protests 
against hazardous projects have been mounted across China. Though 
extensive scholarship has been devoted to the outcomes of environ-
mental contention, a significant distinction between local govern-
ment’s one-off decision change regarding the specific project and 
long-term, locked-in policy change towards better governance has 
largely been overlooked. Meanwhile, environmental contention in 
authoritarian China has largely been studied in terms of disparate epi-
sodes, making systematic observation and effective comparison diffi-
cult. Using crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA), this 
article investigates the effect of social contention on shaping environ-
mental governance, analysing 20 influential cases of environmental 
protests in China from 2007 to 2014. It demonstrates that environ-
mental contention efforts often yield different fruits in their “project 
battles” than in their “policy wars.” Moreover, this study argues that 
environmental protests necessitate ample effort of public policy from 
a variety of social agents with multifaceted mechanisms and strategies, 
highlighting the significance of the protest–advocacy linkage in ex-
tracting better governance from local states in authoritarian settings.  
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Environmentalism in China has ushered in vast change in the past 
decade. Emerging environmental activism and local grievance–based 
environmental contention have posed both multifaceted sociopoliti-
cal challenges and opportunities for the authoritarian state. On the 
broad question of how environmental politics and policies in China 
have been shaped and reshaped, current literature reflects a revival of 
arguments between a traditional, state-corporatist framework (Unger 
and Chan 1995) and a new direction (Howell 2004) of Chinese state–
society relations. Specifically, the state-oriented thesis of environmen-
tal authoritarianism (Beeson 2010) and the collaborative, society-
driven theory of consultative authoritarianism (Teets 2014) both pro-
vide insight. However, existing scholarship falls short of an interac-
tive framework that captures important mechanisms of interpenetra-
tion and mutual shaping of state and society (Yang and Calhoun 
2007). Recent studies on Chinese politics in general have made ex-
ploratory efforts along the theoretical direction of constructing a 
model of state–society interaction. They have examined social agents’ 
“strategic use of the law and formal institutions” (Tsai 2017, 2015; 
Distelhorst 2017; Johnson 2010) and discussed how popular protests 
may shape policy implementation (O’Brien and Li 2006) or policy 
adjustment (Cai 2010). Yet these studies have not treated outcomes 
of contention as the prominent theme with systematic analyses on the 
micro-mechanisms linking protests and policy output. Studies on 
environmental protest and governance can be a fertile field for theo-
retical specification for the aspect of state–society interaction.   
In this article, I seek to answer two questions: 1) How effective 
is environmental contention in shaping the environmental govern-
ance of Chinese local states? 2) Why have some environmental pro-
tests resulted in policy changes while others have not? To investigate 
these questions, I first demonstrate a substantial difference between 
two kinds of “effectiveness” of protests: one is to extract a one-off 
concession from the government on the particular project and re-
dress a specific grievance, which I call “decision change” or “winning 
the project battle,” and the other is to stimulate the government to 
implement transparent, accountable, or inclusive environmental pol-
icy, which I call “policy change” or “winning the policy war.” Second, 
I review existing explanations for decision change and policy change 
in environmental issues and highlight the variable of advocacy in 
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environmental campaigns. Third, I employ crisp-set qualitative com-
parative analysis (csQCA) to examine 20 influential cases of recent 
environmental protests in China from 2007 to 2014. Finally, I analyse 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for environmental protests to 
engender environmental-policy improvement at local levels and em-
phasise the role of social agents’ advocacy in stimulating better gov-
ernance.  
Without denying the indispensable role of a greening leviathan 
(Duit, Feindt, and Meadowcroft 2016), my study engages the theoret-
ical dialogue of state–society interaction in general and emphasises 
the aspect of a socially constructed environmental authoritarianism. It 
demonstrates that Chinese local states have been actively refurbishing 
their governing tools with increasingly inclusive institutions of public 
participation mostly because they are passively compelled to do so by 
various societal thrusts.  
3RZHULQ3URWHVW'HFLVLRQ&KDQJHYV3ROLF\
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The power in people taking grievances to the streets is often exam-
ined by whether they can pressure local governments to make change, 
including decision change at the instance level or policy change at the 
institution level. Existing research has mostly focused on decision-
specific outcomes defined by cancellation, relocation, or continuation 
of polluting facilities targeted by protests (Mertha 2008; Cai 2010; Li, 
Koppenjan, and Verweij 2016). By contrast, the research on policy 
outcomes – that is, institutionalised changes in environmental gov-
ernance that have longer-term, broader-range effects, as opposed to 
an ad hoc compromise on a single case – is rare. This is not to gain-
say efforts in recent studies that have begun to investigate the dimen-
sion of policy change beyond singular decision change as a protest 
outcome. In particular, the new development of the protest–advocacy 
linkage in environmental contentions has been increasingly recog-
nised; this linkage is showcased by the mutual reinforcement of street 
mobilisation and policy advocacy (Steinhardt and Wu 2016), the ver-
tical ties between local contenders and supra-local activists or envir-
onmental NGOs (Bondes and Johnson 2017; Sun, Huang and Yip 
2017), or the strategy shift from a not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY) 
approach to a broad policy-advocacy perspective oriented towards 
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the public interest (Johnson 2013a, 2013b). However, these studies 
are not intended to systematically establish the relationship between 
advocacy efforts and policy change in environmental governance.  
Before I press forward, the importance of distinguishing policy 
change from decision change as the outcome of environmental pro-
test is due further illustration. For one thing, it is often premature to 
operationalise protest outcome with decision change. Seemingly 
“successful” results, such as a local official’s oral promise to cancel a 
project, oftentimes represent political expediency for the purposes of 
public appeasement as the official is under imminent pressure; such 
results are at risk of reversion after social outcry subsides. Many em-
pirical cases involve the scenario of secret resumption of projects 
temporarily halted when they were under protest (Daily News Sina 
2015). For another, decision change to cancel or relocate the project, 
though remarkable, cannot capture nuanced contentious fruits borne 
in the process of protest. As noted in the cases below, protesters 
often hone their networking abilities and environmental expertise 
regardless of whether the project they oppose is cancelled or not. 
Additionally, some protests oppose the opaque decision-making pro-
cess, such as fraud in environmental impact assessment (EIA) proce-
dures, more strongly than the project per se (He, Mol, and Lu 2016). 
If an EIA report is repeatedly revised due to residents’ protests, it 
would be unfair to regard the protest as a failure only because the 
construction has continued. 
In comparison, policy change is a more theoretically valid way to 
connect processes to outcomes. Instead of setting decision change as 
an abrupt ending point immediately after protest, examining policy 
change avoids artificially severing the long-term spillover effect of 
protests on public policy and allows us to observe whether achieve-
ments of social contention can be institutionalised by local states to 
upgrade environmental governance. Therefore, while “winning the 
project battle” is oftentimes characteristic of protesters using the 
state’s laws and terms to resist rightfully in a specific conflict, “win-
ning the policy war” involves a renegotiation of the terms and facili-
tates the redress of generic grievances of the same type in the future.    
The nonconformity between decision change and policy change 
is conspicuous in light of empirical evidence (see Table 6). Occur-
rence of policy change towards better governance does not necessari-
ly go hand in hand with the occurrence of decision change. In other 
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words, a local government’s on-the-spot decision to compromise in a 
particular case by no means denotes a corresponding adjustment in 
environmental policy orientation. Existing research focuses on the 
“project battle” of environmental protests regardless of how they fare 
in the “policy war.” Yet the empirical world is replete with diverse 
scenarios where protests win the “project battle” but lose the “policy 
war,” or even lose the “project battle” but win the “policy war.”   
In this study, I approximate the concept of “policy change” in 
environmental governance from two angles: 1) local governments’ 
promulgation of new environmental laws or regulations, and 2) local 
implementation of environmental accountability policies. Details 
about the measurement of policy change vis-à-vis these two aspects 
will be covered in the methodology section. Admittedly, the publish-
ing of new environmental rules and an improvement in information 
transparency do not guarantee that policy change achieved by protest 
will be securely enshrined as a higher standard of governance in the 
future. Yet it is a big step towards institutionalised protest outcomes 
from those ad hoc, fickle, and tokenistic decisions. 
)URP3URWHVWWR3ROLF\&KDQJH
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Owing to the fertile literature on contentious politics and social 
movements (Tarrow 1994; Tilly and Tarrow 2007), a variety of fac-
tors explaining contentious outcomes in China have been developed 
in existing studies. Among them, four conditions were pointed out 
that are relatively important in explaining variances in local govern-
ments’ decisions – project cancellation, relocation, or continuation – 
in environmental conflicts (Li, Koppenjan, and Verweij 2016).  
 The scale of the protests: The larger the protest is, the more 
likely it is for protesters to reach their goals (Cai 2004). A well-
known popular maxim – “big disturbance big resolution, small 
disturbance small resolution, and no disturbance no resolution” – 
reflects the widely believed association between larger-scale un-
rest and bigger compromises from governments.    
 The form of protest, particularly in terms of whether violence 
occurs in the confrontation: Given that social stability is regard-
ed as local officials’ top priority, scholars generally agree that use 
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of  violence increases pressure on local governments and thus 
raises the protesters’ chances of  extracting concessions (McAdam 
1983; Tarrow 1994).  
 The cost for local governments to compromise: Local govern-
ments invoke a cost–benefit analysis in the face of collective so-
cial challenge (Cai 2010). The earlier the stage of the project is, 
the less costly it is for local governments to change course, and 
thus the more likely it is for the protest to succeed.  
 The position of the central government: In the setting of an 
authoritarian regime with significant local discretion, social con-
tention in China has long been characterised by protesters ex-
ploiting the tension between a legitimacy-oriented central gov-
ernment and interest-driven local officials (O’Brien and Li 2006). 
As long as there is no sign of central government support for the 
project, it is more likely for local governments to concede and 
protesters to prevail. 
After enumerating these four conditions, Li, Koppenjan, and Verweij 
(2016) utilise csQCA to determine which condition or combination 
of conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for environmental pro-
tests to result in decision change. Specifically, they emphasise the 
impact of central-government support and the project stage on deci-
sion change of local governments. They identify “the absence of sup-
port from the central government” as the necessary condition and 
three sufficient paths that explain the occurrence of governmental 
compromise (Appendix 1). 
However, these conventional variables have hindered explana-
tions of the efficacy of popular protests in shaping the state’s social-
governing capacity. In particular, none of the four conditions above 
can convey effectively the policy-advocacy component of environ-
mental campaigns, which is increasingly prevalent in protest cases 
across regions and issues. Therefore, my research introduces a fifth 
condition, the “advocacy variable” of environmental protest, to high-
light the strategic role of policy-oriented social agents in bringing 
forth better governance.  
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The advocacy dimension of the protest, as will be detailed in the 
analyses below, is broadly conceptualised to include the claims, agen-
das, propositions, and strategies of different types of social agents – 
who either initiate the momentum of protest, participate directly in 
demonstrations, or echo the public appeal following the protest – in 
order to explore broader meanings of protests beyond their immedi-
ate localities and concerns. Channelled through social networking of 
environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) (e.g. Sun, 
Huang, and Yip 2017), proposal submissions by disgruntled state and 
academic elites (e.g. Johnson 2010), or online activism on the part of 
concerned netizens (e.g. Lu and Chan 2016), the claim-making or 
agenda-setting activities involved in advocacy efforts typically carry a 
strong tendency towards rationality rather than emotions (Johnson 
2013b) and even demonstrate social agents’ “ownership” of the issue 
at hand through self-learned environmental expertise (Shemtov 1999; 
Lora-Wainwright 2013; Johnson 2013a). I hypothesise that the pres-
ence of advocacy efforts in or right after the protest contributes in 
general to policy change towards better environmental governance.  
There are three prominent social agents that practise policy ad-
vocacy, the first of which are ENGOs. Although mainstream studies 
of Chinese politics have traditionally portrayed social organisations in 
China as weak, dependent, and non-confrontational, or a co-opted 
collaborator of the state at best, my research argues that some 
ENGOs have become capable of abstaining from leading protests at 
the outset yet swaying processes at critical moments, riding on pro-
testers’ collective power, and turning a NIMBY opposition into a 
public interest–oriented campaign that translates to policy adjustment 
in environmental governance. I call such a participatory pattern “the 
afterward-intervening mechanism.”  
The rise of Chinese ENGOs in recent decades, with their in-
creased political leverage and manoeuvring space, can be attributed to 
the strategy of “embeddedness activism” (Ho 2007). Naturally, 
ENGOs with greater policy-advocacy opportunities tend to have 
better financial resources and connections to the party-state system 
(Zhan and Tang 2013). Although such a delicate position of ENGOs 
has drawn some critical concerns (Yang 2005; van Rooij 2010; John-
son 2010), gradually, by performing the afterward-intervening mech-
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anism, ENGOs in some of the empirical cases have found a niche in 
environmental protests to bridge the power of collective action and 
subsequent policy advancement (Sun, Huang, and Yip 2017).  
The second kind of social agents who actively practise environ-
mental-policy advocacy are green-minded public figures, including 
political elites such as representatives to the National People’s Con-
gress (NPC) and members of the Chinese People’s Political Consulta-
tive Committee (CPPCC), well-known scholars, media entrepreneurs, 
and entertainment figures. Among them, NPC representatives and 
CPPCC members are outstanding at exposing controversial projects 
by submitting opposition proposals to their respective bodies’ annual 
meetings. These quasi-democratic formal institutions, traditionally 
perceived as a rubber stamp, have begun to play a bigger, albeit lim-
ited, part in responsive or consultative authoritarianism (Truex 2014; 
Malesky and Schuler 2010). I call this pattern a “beforehand-initiating 
mechanism,” as these actors have the capacity in the beginning stages 
to arouse public attention, disseminate information on unlawful siting 
decisions, ignite opposition against opaque procedures, and garner 
sufficient momentum for collective action. 
Last but not least, activists among ordinary citizens, usually the 
direct victims, constitute the third type of social agents for advocacy. 
All environmental protests involve directly affected citizens, but not 
all citizen participants employ advocacy strategies, which may be 
legal-based, technical-based, or policy suggestion–based. Citizen ac-
tivists may practise legal-based advocacy by framing their opposition 
according to legal terms expressly stipulated in environmental legisla-
tion (e.g. the 2003 EIA law, and the 2008 Measures for Open Envir-
onmental Information) and emphasising procedural justice and right-
to-information laws. They often solicit assistance from environmental 
lawyers to frame their legal claims. Meanwhile, citizen activists can 
also engage technical-based advocacy by educating themselves and 
producing research reports to counter governments’ “official evi-
dence.” These activities are characteristic of a few anti-incineration 
campaigns in Beijing (Johnson 2013a). As for policy suggestion–bas-
ed strategies – the highest degree of advocacy efforts – they are often 
employed by citizen activists in accordance with ENGOs to exert 
broader influence on policy change.   
Overall, social agents, their participatory mechanisms, and advo-
cacy strategies constitute a multifaceted advocacy dimension of envir-
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onmental protests. Their distinctions are not definite. Additionally, 
the combination of actors, mechanisms, and strategies in each case 
vary. Through the method of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) 
detailed below, I argue that, among all relevant factors, the presence 
of advocacy efforts is necessary for environmental protests to compel 
the state to change policies towards better environmental governance. 
0HWKRGRORJ\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QCA is a set-theoretic method that helps discern necessary and suffi-
cient causality with qualitative data in comparative research. It aspires 
to discover causal patterns across sociopolitical phenomena with a 
relatively small number of cases and allows for context-specific causal 
complexity, which may be both conjunctural and equifinal (Schneider 
and Wagemann 2012). Without attempting to overgeneralise causality 
outside the sample, QCA resorts to substantial knowledge and con-
textual backgrounds of cases obtained through in-depth case studies 
and avoids a black-box approach in abstract statistical models. 
QCA works with binary (crisp-set QCA) or ordinal variables 
(fuzzy-set QCA). Due to sensitivity, limited availability, and compro-
mised accuracy of data on contentious issues in authoritarian China, I 
use csQCA in this study with the Truth Table approach to organise 
data (Ragin 1987). Its data-analysis ability is based on Boolean alge-
bra, with logical AND operator connoted by [*] (multiplication) and 
logical OR operator connoted by [+] (addition). The connotation for 
occurrence [1] and non-occurrence [0] of a condition [X] or the out-
come [Y] are [X] and [~X], and [Y] and [~Y], respectively. The Truth 
Table analysis, using the fsQCA 3.0 software (Ragin and Davey 
2016), produces three types of solution formulae: the complex solu-
tion, the parsimonious solution, and the intermediate solution. In the 
language of QCA, these solutions are differentiated by how the “logi-
cal remainder” – a combination of causal conditions that lacks empir-
ical cases – is treated (Ragin and Sonnett 2004). I employ the com-
plex solution in this study to avoid making assumptions about any 
hypothetical cases and depend exclusively on the empirical infor-
mation at hand (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). The results of the 
analysis also report two important measures of QCA: “consistency” 
and “coverage.” “Consistency” assesses the degree to which the cases 
sharing a given condition or combination of conditions agree in dis-
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playing the outcome – the theoretical strength of the subset relation – 
whereas “coverage” assesses the degree to which a condition or caus-
al combination accounts for instances of an outcome – the empirical 
relevance of the subset relation (Ragin 2006).  
'DWD3URFHVVLQJ
In this study, I examine 20 cases of environmental protests that took 
place between 2007 and 2014 in urban China (Appendix 2). They 
cover an expansive geographic region of 10 provinces and municipali-
ties and various types of unpopular projects as protest targets, includ-
ing seven anti-incinerator cases (Panyu, Liulitun, Gao’antun, Asuwei, 
Wujiang, Tianjingwa, Wuxi), four anti-paraxylene (anti-PX) cases 
(Xiamen, Dalian, Kunming, Maoming), three against transport infra-
structure projects (Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing), two against nuclear 
power plants (Rushan, Jiangmen), and four against other power 
plants (Haining, Haimen, Shifang, Qidong). Data collection is mainly 
dependent on news reports, Chinese- and English-language academic 
articles, government documents of laws and regulations, publically 
accessible official datasets, and ENGO research reports.  
The selection of these cases by no means presents the universe 
of environmental protests – sensitive statistics unknown to the public – 
from 2007 to 2014 in the whole country. Neither are these 20 cases in 
any way representative of the population of Chinese environmental 
protests based on any randomisation procedure. However, they are all 
significant and influential cases that have garnered a high degree of 
media exposure, academic interest, and social attention recently, and 
that might be emulated by potential environmental contenders in the 
future. In addition to the consideration of case impact, the decision 
to include or exclude any given case was based on practicality, ac-
cording to information availability. Specifically, some cases were left 
out due to difficulties in obtaining enough empirical information for 
meaningful comparative analysis of important factors such as the 
attitude of central government, stage of the targeted project, or the 
policy-advocacy effort involved in the protest, while in other, more 
recent ones (e.g. the anti-PX protest in Jinshan, Shanghai, in 2015, or 
the “toxic land” case in Changzhou, Jiangsu, in 2016), adequate time 
had not passed to evaluate their impact on policy change by the time 
this article was completed. 
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The rest of this section introduces specifically how I process the 
20 cases with the methods of csQCA. First, Table 1 below displays 
the 14 cases with the occurrence of policy change towards better 
environmental governance in the wake of popular protests, opera-
tionalised by 1) increased environmental information transparency in 
the subsequent one or two years, dependent on data availability, 
measured by the Pollution Information Transparency Index (PITI 
2008/09-2015/16), or 2) environmental institutionalisation, measured 
by new promulgations of local environmental laws or regulations in 
the subsequent two years, given that institutionalisation usually lags. 
Since 2009, the Institute of Public & Environmental Affairs and the 
Natural Resource Defense Council have been assessing the country’s 
performance in disclosing information on pollutants and pollution 
sources at the prefectural level based on the Regulations of the  
People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information and 
the Ministry of Environmental Protection Measures on Open Envir-
onmental Information (trial) – the two milestone regulatory schemes 
for Chinese green transparency promulgated in 2008. With specified 
refinement each year, the assessment scope of the PITI usually con-
sists of enterprise emission data, EIA information, routine super-
vision records, automatic monitoring data, and so on and so forth; 
these assessments are either published by the Environmental Protec-
tion Bureaus (EPB) of each respective city or acquired from infor-
mation disclosure upon request, and then scored according to four 
evaluation criteria – systematic-ness, timeliness, comprehensiveness, 
and user-friendliness. As for new promulgations of local environmen-
tal laws and regulations, they are identified through keyword searches 
(⧟ຳ؍ᣔ, huanjing baohu, environmental protection) on Beidafabao  
(ेབྷ⌅ᇍ), an online database of Chinese legal documents developed 
by Peking University. Notably, in a few cases, especially large-scale 
ones, the local governments did promulgate new environmentally 
relevant regulations after protests (e.g. Maoming, Haimen); yet, they 
were mainly focused on strengthening stability control and enforcing 
emergence measures in environmental crises, rather than geared to-
wards public inclusion in environmental decision-making or policy-
implementation processes. Thus, these new social regulations are not 
indicative of environmental institutional changes considered in this 
research. 
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Case 
PITI 
increase 
New local environmental laws or regulations 
(within the following 2 years) 
Xiamen 
(2007) yes 
Environmental Protection Regulation (Revised),  
Chapter 3 
Dalian 
(2011) no 
Implementation Scheme to Carry out the Work of 
Environmental Education of All the People 
Kunming 
(2013) yes 
Notice on Strengthening Environmental Monitoring 
and Law Enforcement 
Rushan 
(2007) yes N/A 
Haining 
(2011) yes 
Environmental Democracy: The gist of the “Jiaxing 
Model” 
Qidong 
(2012) no 
Major-decision Notice on Detailed Regulations for 
Implementing Social Stability Risk Assessment  
(Nantong) 
Panyu 
(2009) yes 
Opinion on All-round Promotion of Domestic Waste 
Management Work (Guangzhou) 
Liulitun 
(2007) no 
Opinion on Encouraging Social Participation in  
Ecological Restoration (Beijing 2007); Opinion on  
All-round Promotion of Domestic Waste Management 
Work (Beijing 2009); Notice on the “Zhezi” Project on 
Promoting Domestic Waste Management Work  
(Beijing 2010) 
Gao’antun 
(2008) no 
Asuwei 
(2009) yes 
Tianjingwa 
(2009) no 
Urban Management Bureau Experimental Scheme on 
Domestic Waste Sorting Work (Nanjing) 
Beijing 
(2012) yes 
Notice on Further Strengthening the Management of 
EIA Institutes  
Shanghai 
(2007) yes 
Opinion on EIA Public Participation (Trial) and three 
other notices concerning EIA management 
Nanjing 
(2011) yes Urban Landscaping Regulations 
In the next step, I translate case information into membership scores 
in sets (variables) of csQCA, the process of which is called calibration 
of set membership scores (Ragin 2008; Schneider and Wagemann 
2010). As detailed in Table 2, qualitative anchors (the set membership 
scores of “0” and “1” in csQCA) are specified for calibrating the 
outcome and the five explanatory variables. Specifically, for the vari-
able of “central position,” the positions of the State Council or Chi-
nese national mass media (e.g. the People’s Daily and the Xinhua News 
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
Agency) after the occurrence of protests are taken to interpret and 
approximate the attitude of the central government (Li, Koppenjan, 
and Verweij 2016). Statements in national media trying to vindicate 
the debated projects and criticising the “mass incidents” are indicative 
of the presence of support (calibrated as “1”), while statements order-
ing local governments to reconsider the project according to the pub-
lic concerns, or pointing out an increase in public environmental 
awareness, or urging local officials to balance inter-governmental, 
competing priorities between economic development and environ-
ment protection, and so on, indicate the absence of support (calibrat-
ed as “0”). For the variable of “policy advocacy,” the condition of 
main interest in this study, I calibrate cases as “1” if any kind of social 
agents (e.g. ENGOs, public figures, or activists among citizens) en-
gaged policy-advocacy efforts (e.g. legal-based, technical-based, public 
suggestion–based) to voice their opposition and advance their agenda – 
whether narrow or broad – before, during, and/or after protest. Cas-
es without any documentation of such efforts are calibrated as “0.”    
7DEOH &DOLEUDWLRQRI6HW0HPEHUVKLS6FRUHV
(1) Outcome variable (O) 
Set Indicator Case Score 
Presence 
of policy 
change 
Promulgation 
of new local 
environmental 
laws or regula-
tions 
Xiamen, Dalian, Kunming, 
Haining, Qidong, Panyu, Liuli-
tun, Gao’antun, Asuwei, Tian-
jingwa, Beijing, Shanghai, Nan-
jing 
1 
 
Increase in 
local environ-
mental infor-
mation trans-
parency 
Xiamen, Kunming, Rushan, 
Haining, Panyu, Asuwei, Beijing, 
Shanghai, Nanjing 
1 
Absence of 
policy 
change 
No promulga-
tion of new 
local environ-
mental laws or 
regulations; 
AND no 
increase in 
environmental 
information 
transparency 
Maoming, Jiangmen, Haimen, 
Shifang, Wujiang, Wuxi 
0 

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(2) Variable: protest scale (L) 
Set Indicator Case Score 
Large-scale Protests with 
more than 
5,000 partici-
pants a) 
Xiamen, Dalian, Maoming, 
Haimen, Shifang, Qidong, 
Wujiang, Wuxi 
1 
Small-scale Protests with 
fewer than 
5,000 partici-
pants 
Kunming, Rushan, Jiangmen, 
Haining, Panyu, Liulitun, 
Gao’antun, Asuwei, Tianjingwa, 
Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing  
0 
(3) Variable: protest form (V) 
Set Indicator Case Score 
Violent Presence of 
casualties or 
injuries 
Maoming, Haining, Haimen, 
Shifang, Qidong, Wuxi 
1 
Peaceful Absence of 
casualties or 
injuries 
Xiamen, Dalian, Kunming, 
Rushan, Jiangmen, Panyu, Liuli-
tun, Gao’antun, Asuwei, 
Wujiang, Tianjingwa,b) Beijing, 
Shanghai, Nanjing 
0 
(4) Variable: project stage (E) 
Set Indicator Case Score 
Early Planning / 
research 
stages, or 
initial con-
struction 
Xiamen, Maoming, Rushan, 
Jiangmen, Haimen, Shifang, 
Qidong, Panyu, Liulitun, Asuwei, 
Wujiang, Tianjingwa, Beijing, 
Shanghai, Nanjing 
1 
Late Substantial 
investments, 
or before / 
trial / in 
operation  
Dalian, Kunming, Haining, 
Gao’antun, Wuxi 
0 
(5) Variable: central position (S) 
Set Indicator Case Score 
Presence 
of support 
Presence of 
support for 
the project 
Dalian, Kunming, Maoming, 
Gao’antun 
1 
Absence of 
support 
Absence of 
support, or 
silence, or 
contradictory 
position 
Xiamen, Rushan, Jiangmen, 
Haining, Haimen Shifang, 
Qidong, Panyu, Liulitun, Asuwei, 
Wujiang, Wuxi, Tianjingwa, 
Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing 
0 

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(6) Variable: policy advocacy (A) 
Set Indicator Case Score 
Present of 
advocacy  
Presence of 
policy advoca-
cy efforts by 
ENGOs 
activists, 
political elites, 
academics, 
media cam-
paigners, 
and/or other 
involved 
protesters  
Xiamen, Dalian, Kunming, 
Rushan, Haining, Qidong, Panyu, 
Liulitun, Gao’antun, Asuwei, 
Tianjingwa, Beijing, Shanghai, 
Nanjing 
1 
Absence of 
advocacy  
Absence of 
policy advoca-
cy efforts by 
above-
mentioned 
activists 
Maoming, Jiangmen, Haimen, 
Shifang, Wujiang, Wuxi 
0 
1RWH D1XPEHUVRISURWHVWVFDQRQO\EHDSSUR[LPDWHGVLQFHWKHUHLVQRRIILFLDOGDWD
RQWKLV,ZRUNZLWKWKHFURVVRYHUSRLQWRISDUWLFLSDQWV
E$OWKRXJKYLROHQFHRFFXUUHGWKHLQIOXHQFHZDVOLPLWHG/L.RSSHQMDQDQG
9HUZHLM
7DEOH 7KH7UXWK7DEOH*HQHUDWHGE\WKHIV4&$6RIWZDUH
Row Conditions Outcome  
 L V E S A O Cases 
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 
Rushan, Panyu, Liulitun, Asuwei, 
Tianjingwa, Beijing, Shanghai, 
Nanjing 
2 0 0 0 1 1 1 Kunming, Gao’antun 
3 0 1 0 0 1 1 Haining 
4 1 0 1 0 1 1 Xiamen 
5 1 1 1 0 1 1 Qidong 
6 1 0 0 1 1 1 Dalian 
7 1 1 1 0 0 0 Haimen, Shifang 
8 1 1 0 0 0 0 Wuxi 
9 0 0 1 0 0 0 Jiangmen 
10 1 0 1 0 0 0 Wujiang 
11 1 1 1 1 0 0 Maoming 
1RWH / SURWHVWVFDOH9 SURWHVWIRUP( SURMHFWVWDJH6 FHQWUDOVXSSRUW
$ SROLF\DGYRFDF\2 RXWFRPHLHSROLF\FKDQJHLQHQYLURQPHQWDO
JRYHUQDQFH
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After this procedure, the calibrated data was able to be entered into a 
dichotomous data matrix (Appendix 3), ready for use in the fsQCA 
software with the Truth Table Algorithm, as displayed in Table 3. 
Finally, the Truth Table Algorithm produces the results of conjunc-
tural causal paths from environmental protests to policy changes in 
environmental governance, which include the necessary conditions 
(Table 4) and sufficient solutions (Table 5). 
$QDO\VHVDQG5HVXOWV
2FFXUUHQFHRI(QYLURQPHQWDO3ROLF\&KDQJH
1HFHVVLW\$QDO\VLV
In the necessity analysis, the threshold of “1” is used to exclude all 
contradictory configurations (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). As the 
results in Table 4 indicate, policy changes occur only when the pro-
tests involve advocacy efforts during environmental campaigns. Other 
factors, with consistency rates less than “1,” fall short of being a ne-
cessary condition for the outcome.  
7DEOH $QDO\VLVRI1HFHVVDU\&RQGLWLRQVIRU3ROLF\&KDQJH
Conditions Consistency Coverage 
L 0.21 0.38 
~L 0.79 0.92 
V 0.14 0.33 
~V 0.86 0.86 
E 0.71 0.67 
~E 0.29 0.80 
S 0.21 0.75 
~S 0.79 0.69 
A 1.00 1.00 
~A 0.00 0.00 
1RWH 7KH³a´LQIURQWRIWKHOHWWHUPHDQVQRQRFFXUUHQFHRUDEVHQFHRIWKHFRQGLWLRQ
Among the 14 cases where policy-advocacy efforts are present along-
side the environmental protests (Table 3, shaded area), a variety of 
activists employed multiple strategies to varying degrees to corrobor-
ate their oppositions. For instance, the anti-incinerator cases of Panyu 
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and Asuwei and the anti-PX protest in Kunming are most distinct 
with their advocacy direction at promoting broad public interest and 
providing policy suggestion (Johnson 2013a, 2013b; Steinhardt and 
Wu 2016), while the campaign against the nuclear power plant in 
Rushan still resembles a typical NIMBY case, with its legal- and me-
dia-based advocacy energy strictly confined to opposing a specific 
siting decision (Zeng, Dai, and Wang 2014). As a result, the Panyu, 
Asuwei, and Kunming cases harvested both the promulgation of new 
environmental regulations and increased implementation of infor-
mation-transparency policy after protests (see Table 1). Furthermore, 
the Public Consultative and Supervision Committee for Urban Waste 
Management was established in Guangzhou (Wong 2016), which 
highlights the profound impact of the Panyu protest on public par-
ticipation in environmental governance at a higher institutional level. 
In comparison, although the city of Weihai, where the Rushan protest 
took place, improved in its information-transparency record (the 
PITI score increased from “45.4” in 2008 to “51.1” in 2009/10), no 
environmental law or regulation was issued locally to consolidate the 
fruit of the campaign. 
As for the actors of advocacy, there are three salient types: First, 
when the tide of protests ebbed, ENGOs, realising that relocating PX 
projects or incinerators to remote or suburban areas after urban op-
position is not a sustainable solution, pick up the undertaking of pol-
icy suggestion beyond parochial interest. In the wake of the Panyu 
protest, Beijing-based NGOs such as Friends of Nature, Green Bea-
gle Environmental Institute, and the Nature University provided 
mentorship for the campaigners in Guangzhou to redirect their focus 
onto policy recommendations for the municipal government. A new 
local ENGO, Eco Canton, was established in 2012 as a formal organ-
isational structure to carry out long-term, cross-regional policy initia-
tive for urban waste management (Lang and Xu 2013; Wong 2016; 
Steinhardt and Wu 2016). Similarly, after the Kunming protest, two 
influential and active local ENGOs, Green Watershed and Green 
Kunming, launched an advocacy coalition – also with ENGOs in 
Beijing – to push for a more transparent decision-making process 
with public monitoring and consultation in deciding any future PX 
projects.  
In contrast to these high-profile, post-protest advocacy efforts, 
however, many other ENGOs with fewer resources and connections 
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limit themselves to the realm of conservative strategies, focus on 
localised concerns, and stay vigilant about any “mass incidents.” For 
instance, the Ocean Commune for Environmental Protection in the 
Rushan case collected thousands of signatures of opposition online 
and submitted them to the State Environmental Protection Admin-
istration (SEPA) (He 2008). The Dalian Association of Environmen-
tal Protection Volunteers conducted evidence collection at the site of 
the broken dyke near the PX plant before the Dalian protest (Minzhu 
yu Fazhi 2011). In the Xiamen case, the Green Cross Association, the 
city’s only ENGO, publicly adopted a neutral stance on the matter. In 
the Liulitun protest, Beijing NGOs distanced themselves from the 
campaign despite being approached by residents (Johnson 2010).  
The second type of salient advocacy actor is public figures, such 
as political elites, journalists, and entertainers, who have played an 
important role in encouraging public discussion and assembling social 
momentum to initiate collective action or reinforce the campaign. For 
instance, in the Xiamen case, Zhong Xiaoyong, a local blogger and 
columnist, was devoted to publishing media reports in the initial stages 
of the campaign. In addition, Zhao Yufen, a Xiamen University pro-
fessor, submitted a proposal to the CPPCC’s annual meeting, together 
with 100 other members, to question the adjacency of the PX plant 
to residents (Zeng and Jiang 2008). It was only then that the citizenry 
became aware of the project, which was hitherto quietly under con-
struction. The Nanjing case garnered sympathy and support from 
sports commentators, movie directors, television hosts, and even a 
political commentator and member of Taiwan’s Kuomintang Party  
(ѝഭഭ≁ފZhongguo Guomindang), which has historically been 
associated with Nanjing (Meng 2011). NPC representatives, CPPCC 
members, and former officials also played similar roles in the Qidong 
case (Lu and Chan 2016), the Liulitun case (Johnson 2013a), and the 
Shanghai case. Especially in the anti-maglev protest in Shanghai, 
Wang Mengshu, an NPC representative and a renowned academician 
at the Chinese Academy of Engineering, not only called for broad 
social opposition based on his political prestige but made good use of 
his technical expertise to challenge the scientific reliability of the pro-
ject (Finance.ifeng 2009). 
Activists among ordinary citizens comprise the third type of in-
dispensable actors in policy advocacy. In the cases of Panyu, Liulitun, 
Asuwei, and, to a lesser degree, Gao’antun, citizen campaigners have 
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gradually acquired contentious savvy, become legal and technical 
experts on waste disposal through self-study and networking, and 
shifted their strategy from a NIMBY-style opposition to broad advo-
cacy on consultative incineration policy (Johnson 2013a, 2013b). In 
Nanjing, citizen representatives of the affected homeowners framed 
their opposition towards the Tianjingwa project on legal terms and 
repeatedly invoked the EIA law to demand public hearings during the 
prolonged contentious process (Yang 2009). And in the Shanghai 
case, the solid middle-class community of affected residents, with a 
strong sense of being part of a global society, even wrote to German 
chancellor Angela Merkel and requested her intervention, given that 
German companies Siemens and ThyssenKrupp were part of the 
maglev-construction consortium they were fighting against (Stern 
2013: 92).  
Overall, these cases of protest–advocacy linkage in environmen-
tal campaigns demonstrate how one-off street actions can evolve into 
policy advocacy for environmental transparency and public participa-
tion in policymaking. The ENGOs, public figures, and active citizens, 
resonating with and supplementing each other at different aspects in 
their advocacy efforts before, during, and after protests, have 
achieved successful results in the “policy war” at the local level. Gen-
erally speaking, although ENGOs usually cautiously estrange them-
selves from local protests for the sake of their very survival, they are 
more passionate about general environmentalist interest and better 
positioned to promote public policy in an afterward-intervening fash-
ion. Public figures and all sorts of political as well as social elites are 
most effective in exposing the controversial project, arousing public 
attention, and playing a beforehand-initiating role in the campaigns. 
As for active citizens, they may penetrate the whole process and flex-
ibly exert their collective clout on the direction of issues at hand.  
2FFXUUHQFHRI(QYLURQPHQWDO3ROLF\&KDQJH
6XIILFLHQF\$QDO\VLV
As for sufficient causality for the occurrence of policy change after 
environmental protests (Table 5), the Truth Table generates the fol-
lowing solutions: ~V*E*~S*A + ~V*~E*S*A + L*E*~S*A + 
~L*V*~E*~S*A Ⱥ O. This complex solution formula, in the for-
mat of “multiple conjunctural causation” (Ragin 1987), contains four 
combinational paths, each of which leads sufficiently to the occur-
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rence of policy change. In other words, except the presence of advo-
cacy (A), which is the necessary condition according to the necessity 
analysis above, all other factors are insufficient (I) but non-redundant 
(N) parts of a condition that is itself unnecessary (U) but sufficient (S) 
for the occurrence of environmental policy change (the so-called 
INUS causes in Mackie 1980). The perfect consistency scores of 
these four paths (i.e. all “1”s) denote that there are no contradictions 
in the data.  
7DEOH $QDO\VLVRI6XIILFLHQW&RQGLWLRQVIRU3ROLF\&KDQJH&RPSOH[
6ROXWLRQ
 
Raw 
cover-
age a 
Unique 
coverage b 
Con-
sistency 
Cases 
1. ~V*E*~S*A 0.64 0.57 1 
Xiamen, Rushan, Panyu, 
Liulitun, Asuwei, Tian-
jingwa, Beijing, Shang-
hai, Nanjing 
2. ~V*~E*S*A 0.21 0.21 1 Dalian, Kunming, Gao’antun 
3. L*E*~S*A 0.14 0.07 1 Xiamen, Qidong 
4. ~L*V*~E*~S*A 0.07 0.07 1 Haining 
Solution  
coverage c: 1     
Solution  
consistency d: 1   
  
1RWH DPHDVXUHVWKHSURSRUWLRQRIPHPEHUVKLSVLQWKHRXWFRPHH[SODLQHGE\HDFK
WHUPRIWKHVROXWLRQ
EPHDVXUHVWKHSURSRUWLRQRIPHPEHUVKLSVLQWKHRXWFRPHH[SODLQHGVROHO\E\
HDFKLQGLYLGXDOVROXWLRQWHUP
FPHDVXUHVWKHSURSRUWLRQRIPHPEHUVKLSVLQWKHRXWFRPHWKDWLVH[SODLQHGE\
WKHFRPSOHWHVROXWLRQ
GPHDVXUHVWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKPHPEHUVKLSLQWKHVROXWLRQLHWKHVHWRIVR
OXWLRQWHUPVLVDVXEVHWRIPHPEHUVKLSLQWKHRXWFRPH)RUFDOFXODWLRQGHWDLOV
VHHID4&$PDQXDO
Path 1, which is the combination of peaceful protest, early-stage pro-
ject, absence of central support, and policy-advocacy efforts (1. 
~V*E*~S*A), captures causal dynamics in nine out of the 20 cases in 
total, and thus reports the highest coverage score in the data. Together 
with Path 3, which is the combination of large-scale protest, early-
stage project, absence of central support, and policy advocacy (3. 
L*E*~S*A), these two causal combinations account for almost 80 
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per cent of the cases (11 out of 14) with the occurrence of policy 
change. These findings are consistent with conventional wisdom, 
which maintains that environmental protests are more likely to “win 
the project battle” if targeted projects are in their early stage and if 
the central government does not evidently support the project. In 
other words, treating either policy change or decision change as pro-
test outcome, results demonstrate that project stage and central sup-
port tend to be more important conditions than the scale and form of 
protest. Here the only added value seems to be that when protests 
against early-stage projects, without central support, are joined with 
additional advocacy efforts, they are very likely to win both the “pro-
ject battle” and the “policy war.”  
However, the Asuwei case is somewhat distinct, as the protest 
did not lead to a clear-cut decision change. The incinerator project 
they targeted stayed in limbo for only a few years after the protest 
and was resumed in 2015 (Wei 2015). Yet its impact on local envir-
onmental governance at the policy level is manifest. In 2010, the Bei-
jing municipal government (2010) issued the Zhezi Project on Pro-
moting Domestic Waste Management Work, which underlined the 
necessity of establishing an information-transparency regime for 
waste facilities. The Zhezi project denotes the type of important ad-
ministrative task in Chinese governments that is featured with neces-
sity of completion within a specified time limit. It often involves co-
ordination among multiple governmental departments and demon-
strates the importance the government attaches to the issue. Mean-
while, the capital’s PITI score also increased significantly after the 
Asuwei protest (from “43.5” in 2009/10 to “72.9” in 2011). As ar-
gued above, this case suggests the unreliability of treating decision 
change as protest outcome solely and highlights the unique value of 
taking policy change into consideration. 
If inconsistency between the “project battle” and “policy war” in 
the assessment of protest outcome is not perceivable in most cases 
covered by Paths 1 and 3, the three cases covered by Path 2 can most 
evidently expose the salience of such a discrepancy. The cases of 
Dalian, Kunming, and Gao’antun, combining conditions of peaceful 
protest, late-stage project, central support, and policy advocacy (2. 
~V*~E*S*A), all failed to pressure local governments to cancel or 
relocate the projects. Specifically, the targeted projects were either 
under substantial investment (Kunming) or in the operational stage 
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(Dalian, Gao’antun). Moreover, the central government signalled its 
support of the projects in all three cases: in the Gao’antun case, the 
State Council supported SEPA’s position of not disclosing the full 
EIA report to residents, given company secrets (Johnson 2013a); in 
the Dalian case, the National Development and Reform Commission 
framed the protest as a result of unsafe production rather than envir-
onmental hazard; in the Kunming case, national media propagated 
the harmlessness and economic necessity of the project (Li, Koppen-
jan, and Verweij 2016). In spite of adverse conditions and the futility 
of attempting to cause a change in the government’s decision, these 
three protests succeeded in ushering in better environmental govern-
ance at a policy level. The Kunming Municipal Party Committee and 
government promulgated the Notice on Strengthening Environmen-
tal Monitoring and Law Enforcement in 2015 (Kunming Municipal 
Party Committee 2015), with emphasis on information disclosure. 
The PITI score of Kunming also increased in the next year (from 
“13.8” in 2013 to “30.2” in 2014/15; note that the PITI adopted a 
few major adjustments of assessment for the year of 2013 and on-
ward). The Dalian government initiated new implementation meas-
ures on environmental education in 2013 especially geared towards 
public participation of citizenry, social media, and ENGOs (Dalian 
Municipal Government 2013). And the Beijing government, con-
cerned with the case of Gao’antun, issued the Suggestion on All-
Round Promotion of Domestic Waste Management Work in 2009 
(Beijing Municipal Party Committee 2009), which also mentioned the 
importance of collecting public opinion and expanding public partici-
pation for the policymaking process of urban waste management. 
Lastly, Path 4 covers the single case of Haining, the combination 
of small-scale and violent protest, late-stage project, absence of cen-
tral support, and advocacy efforts (4. ~L*V*~E*~S*A). The Haining 
protest is worthy of exceptional explanation due to the afterward-
intervening role of the Jiaxing Confederation of Environmental Pro-
tection (JCEP), a government-organised NGO. In this case, advocacy 
efforts by local NGOs or residents were scant except that the JCEP 
reportedly investigated the pollution problem after the protest. This 
symbolic motion was in tune with local officials’ environmental agen-
da for political performance of that time. Later on, the so-called “En-
vironmental Democracy of the Jiaxing Model” was broadly propa-
gandised and promoted across Zhejiang Province to encourage local 
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integration of administrative and civil resources for environmental 
protection (Shen 2014).  
1RQ2FFXUUHQFHRI(QYLURQPHQWDO3ROLF\&KDQJH
1HFHVVLW\DQG6XIILFLHQF\
The results of necessity and sufficiency analyses of the protests with 
no policy change are displayed in Appendices 4 and 5, respectively, as 
supplements to this study. The absence of advocacy efforts is the 
necessary condition for policy changes not to occur in the aftermath 
of environmental campaigns. The complex solution to non-
occurrence of policy change is ~V*E*~S*~A + L*V*~S*~A + 
L*V*E*~A Ⱥ~O. 
For the six cases of no policy change, governments made con-
cessions to protesters and changed their decisions in three instances: 
Maoming, Shifang, and Wuxi. For the remaining three cases – Jiang-
men, Haimen, and Wujing – governments also suspended projects to 
appease heightened social grievance but resumed them later. These 
empirical cases clearly demonstrate that protests, especially large-scale 
ones (Wuxi, Maoming, Shifang, Haimen), may achieve volatile suc-
cess in the “project battle” but capture no spoils in the “policy war.” 
Regrettably, without bringing in policy improvement, these one-off 
protests can hardly exert long-term clout on local environmental 
governance.  
&RQFOXVLRQ
This article has examined the protest–advocacy nexus in environmen-
tal contention and the resultant policy change at the level of Chinese 
local states. It has contributed to the scholarly debates on environ-
mental protests and politics in China in terms of three important 
aspects. First, it distinguishes between decision change and policy 
change, and thereby specifies the difference between local officials’ 
one-off compromises on particular unwelcome projects, which had 
previously been somewhat misleadingly lumped under policy change, 
and longer-term, institutionalised change in environmental govern-
ance. As shown in Table 6, the two types of contentious outcomes 
are contradictory to each other in seven out of the 20 cases under this 
study (the bottom left cell and the top right cell). Even when they 
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appear in conformity, the causal mechanisms linking protest condi-
tions to these two types of outcomes may significantly differ. It there-
fore makes sense to conceptualise environmental contentions with 
distinct achievements in “project battles” and “policy wars.”   
7DEOH 3URWHVW2XWFRPHV3URMHFW%DWWOHYV3ROLF\:DU
              Policy war 
 
Project battle       
Winning Losing 
Winning 
Xiamen, Rushan, 
Panyu, Liulitun, 
Tianjingwa, Bei-
jing, Shanghai, 
Nanjing, Haining, 
Qidong 
Maoming, Wuxi, Shifang 
Losing 
Dalian, Kunming, 
Gao’antun, 
Asuwei, 
Jiangmen, Wujiang, Haimen 
1RWH ,QWKHFDVHVRI.XQPLQJ-LDQJPHQ:XMLDQJDQG+DLPHQSURMHFWVZHUH
VXVSHQGHGDIWHUSURWHVWVEXWUHVXPHGODWHU,QWKHFDVHRI$VXZHLWKHGHFLVLRQ
DERXWWKHSURMHFWUHPDLQHGXQFHUWDLQIRUDIHZ\HDUVDIWHUWKHSURWHVWXQWLOZDV
UHVXPHGLQ
Second, rather than depending on ad hoc and unstable decision 
change to assess protest outcome, this study has resorted to policy 
change – operationalised by improvement in transparency-policy 
implementation and new promulgation of environmental rules – as 
the indicator of a profound protest for advancing environmental 
governance. Using the method of csQCA, it has identified advocacy 
efforts as the necessary condition for policy change and delineated 
four sufficient paths, each combining different conventional factors 
of popular protest in China, for environmental protests to be trans-
lated into institutionalised policy adjustments. Admittedly, QCA 
based on the 20 cases cannot be stretched to make a sweeping causal 
argument that attributes policy change to the protest–advocacy link-
age solely; and the findings with this method have by no means dis-
credited the effect of conventional variables (scale, form, cost, and 
the attitude of the central government) in the complex and holistic 
political processes of popular protests. Yet my study has stressed the 
necessity – rather than sufficiency – of the advocacy variable for pol-
icy change, and explored plausible micro-mechanisms of advocacy 
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strategies with methodological refinement, which other research has 
begun to uncover but not yet been able to specify. 
Third, the present study has exhibited a multifaceted realm of 
various social agents (ENGOs, public figures, activists among ordi-
nary citizens) practising manifold strategies (legal-based, technical-
based, policy suggestion–based) and mechanisms (beforehand-initiat-
ing and afterward-intervening) for policy advocacy, which goes be-
yond grievance-based, NIMBY-natured local contentions. It thereby 
enriches the new insights on a trend of mutually reinforcing dynamics 
of protest and policy advocacy that highlight the role of social forces 
in inducing environmental policy change, even though they remain 
weakly coordinated and decentralised. 
How significant might the emerging protest–advocacy linkage be 
for environmental politics and state–society relations in authoritarian 
China in general? In one sense, the prospect of increased and deep-
ened protest–advocacy ties can be limited. In an increasingly restless 
society under one-party rule, ENGOs have to abstain from organis-
ing popular protests directly and maintain a distance from them, lest 
their very survival and delicate niche of “embeddedness” be jeopard-
ised (Ho and Edmonds 2007). Meanwhile, except for a few influential 
ones like the Friends of Nature and Green Watershed, ENGOs that 
are capable, resourceful, and determined enough to exert clout in 
policy change are pitifully rare across the country. In addition, the 
involvement of government-organised ENGOs after the protest, 
such as the JCEP in the Haining case, may lead some cautious ob-
servers to doubt the genuine nature of social agents engaging popular 
power and argue for the mechanism of state co-optation instead. 
On the positive side, however, the study suggests that the sober-
ing sociopolitical condition of Chinese ENGOs in China has also 
stimulated them to seek broad strategic alliances with green-minded 
elites, media, and activists among ordinary citizens, and to piggyback 
on local people’s collective power to renegotiate the terms of local 
environmental governance of the state. This is not to say there has 
been a retreat of the state; instead, the evidence emphasises the role 
of social collaboration with the state and stresses a socially created 
aspect of environmental authoritarianism. Moreover, going beyond 
the established argument for fragmentation and pluralism of Chinese 
authoritarianism, which contends that governmental agencies or re-
gime insiders seamlessly ally with NGOs, the public, and the press to 
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oppose certain developmental projects (Mertha 2008), my study im-
plies that, even when sympathetic regime insiders are hard to identify 
and the central government is supportive of the projects (e.g. Dalian, 
Kunming, Gao’antun), grievance-based local protests – with the con-
tentious orientation shifting from parochial interests to public con-
cerns at the institutional level – can still succeed in improving policy 
in spite of failing to stop the projects themselves. Collectively and 
gradually, environmental activism in the form of the protest–advo-
cacy conjunction may amount to an indispensable dimension of the 
state-led yet society-shaped Chinese environmental authoritarianism. 
Finally, although due to the limit of the methodological design of 
this study I have refrained from claiming that the protest–advocacy 
linkage influences national policy, the findings here have obvious 
implications for environmental governance in far-reaching regions 
beyond those directly affected by the protests. Contentions diffuse, 
and so do public policies (Tarrow 2010; Zhang 2015; Bondes and 
Johnson 2017; Zhu 2017). Horizontally, in the aftermath of the high 
peak of anti-incinerator protests in 2009, the municipal governments 
in Guangzhou, Beijing, and Nanjing all promoted “Domestic Waste 
Management Work,” a policy response to respective protests locally 
but also a response that suggests that learning processes and spillover 
effects of popular resistance and public policymaking can transcend 
localities. Vertically, an influential, large-scale protest might induce an 
upward scale shift in policy response at different governmental levels. 
For instance, after the protest in Qidong, which is under the jurisdic-
tion of Nantong Municipality, not only did the Nantong EPB issue 
the Major-Decision Notice on Detailed Regulations for Implement-
ing Social Stability Risk Assessment, but the Jiangsu Provincial De-
partment of Environmental Protection (2012) promulgated the Sug-
gestions on Feasibly Strengthening Public Participation in Environ-
mental Protection of Construction Projects, which further specified 
the announcement, questionnaire, and media coverage requirements 
for EIA approval. What is more, the Ministry of Environmental Pro-
tection also issued a new requirement promptly after the protest that 
all EIA reports submitted to EPBs should be accompanied by an 
abridged version made directly available to the public (Feng and 
Wang 2012). These implications, therefore, might be indicative of the 
directions for future research on the dynamics of protest and policy 
diffusions. It would be particularly important for such research to 
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expound on the role of the contentious protest–advocacy linkage in 
promoting transregional and supra-local policy change in the envir-
onmental governance of the Chinese state. 
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Conditions of the 
protest  
Sufficient paths Outcome 
x Scale  
(large or small); 
x Form  
(violent or peaceful); 
x Cost (early or late);  
x Position of the 
central govern-
ment (support or 
not) 
1) absence of central support + 
presence of large-scale scale + 
strong violent protests + late stage 
of the project  
2) absence of central support + 
absence of violence + early stage 
of the project 
3) absence of central support + 
early stage of the project + absence 
of large-scale protests 
Occurrence of 
government 
decision change 
(i.e. project 
cancellation or 
relocation) 
 Necessary condition: absence of central support  





  36 Phoebe Mengxiao Tang 

$SSHQGL[ /LVWRIWKH&DVHVRI&KLQHVH(QYLURQPHQWDO
&RQWHQWLRQLQWKLV6WXG\
1. The Xiamin Case 
In June 2007, tens of thousands of citizens peacefully rallied against a PX plant, 
which was under its early construction stage, in Xiamen, Fujian Province. The pro-
test forced the government to relocate the project to Zhangzhou, an inland city in 
the province.  
2. The Dalian Case 
In August 2011, a storm broke the dyke around an operational PX plant, sparking 
the fear of toxic leakage and a peaceful protest of more than 10,000 residents in 
Dalian, Liaoning Province. After the city government’s initial promise to close the 
plant, operation was later resumed.  
3. The Kunming Case 
In May 2013, two large protests took place against a PX project in the An’ning In-
dustrial Park in Kunming, Yunnan Province. The mayor announced the suspension 
of the project, but later the planning of the project was resumed. 
4. The Maoming Case 
In March 2014, local citizens in Maoming, Guangdong Province, rallied in front of 
the municipal government compound to protest against a PX project. The estimation 
of overall participants varies from a few thousand to ten thousand. Project was 
suspended after protest upon further investigation.  
5. The Rushan Case 
From March to December in 2007, the property owners of the Yintan Community in 
Rushan, Shandong Province, mobilized against the Hongshiding nuclear power 
project and challenged its controversial siting. The number of participants is un-
known but estimated to be small. The project was cancelled in the end.  
6. The Jiangmen Case 
In July 2013, about one thousand residents took to the streets in Jiangmen, Guang-
dong Province, and gathered outside the municipal government’s headquarters 
against a proposed uranium-processing facility. The city’s Communist Party chief 
later promised to scrap the project. 
7. The Panyu Case 
From October to December in 2009, about 500 residents peacefully protested against 
an incineration power plant in Panyu, Guangdong Province. A network of activists 
and groups thrived, attracting public attention and proposing policy suggestions. The 
local government was pressurized to relocate the project. 
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8. The Liulitun Case 
In June 2007, a peaceful demonstration of more than 1,000 local residents took place 
in front of the headquarter of the State Environmental Protection Administration 
(SEPA) in Beijing to protest against the Liulitun Incinerator in Haidian District. 
Eventually the local government confirmed that the project would be relocated. 
9. The Gao’antun Case 
From August to October in 2008, residents mobilized against the Gao’antun Inciner-
ator in Chaoyang District, Beijing. The project was virtually completed by the time of 
protest. Residents focused their opposition on legal issues. Several peaceful “strolls” 
of a few hundred protesters were organized. Ultimately, they failed to prevent the 
incinerator from operating. 
10. The Asuwei Case 
In September 2009, more than one hundred residents of the Aobei Community in 
Changping District, Beijing, converged at the Agricultural Exhibition Center to 
protest against the Asuwei Incinerator. Later, activists proposed waste management 
policy suggestions. The project remained in limbo for several years and was re-started 
in 2015. 
11. The Wujiang Case 
In October 2009, as many as twenty thousand residents in Wujiang, Jiangsu Prov-
ince, occupied an incinerator plant and confronted several thousand policemen. The 
city government suspended the construction after protest. Yet reports show opera-
tion was resumed in 2016. 
12. The Tianjingwa Case 
In February 2009, about 100 residents protested against the Tianjingwa Incinerator in 
Nanjing, Jiangsu Province. Some people from local EPB used force to suppress it. 
The plant under planning was finally relocated. 
13. The Wuxi Case 
From April to May in 2011, a large-scale protest of about 10,000 local villagers oc-
curred against a waste incinerator, which was in its trial operation, in Wuxi, Jiangsu 
Province. There was substantial violence in the confrontation between protesters and 
anti-riot police. Eventually, the project was dismantled.   
14. The Beijing Case 
From June to December in 2012, in Chaoyang District, Beijing, over 100,000 resi-
dents in 34 neighbourhoods along the proposed Beijing–Shenyang high-speed rail-
way (HSR), in a variety of public protest activities, including a demonstration of 
more than 1,000 participants, decried EIA fraud. As a response, the Ministry of 
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Environmental Protection rejected the third EIA report of the project and com-
manded further adjustment. 
15. The Shanghai Case 
From March to April in 2007, worried about a 22.5-meter safety zone, residents 
along the proposed Shanghai–Hangzhou maglev line in Minhang District, Shanghai, 
organised weekly demonstrations of more than 500 participants at the city and dis-
trict governments. The project was eventually cancelled. 
16. The Nanjing Case 
In March 2011, a few hundred citizens gathered for a peaceful sit-in in front of the 
city library in Nanjing, Jiangsu Province, to protest against the cutting down of 
phoenix trees, regarded as the symbol of the city, to make way for a new subway line. 
On the following day, the local authority ordered that the line be altered. 
17. The Haining Case 
In September 2011, approximately 500 local villagers protested against a solar panel 
plant (JinkoSolar) in Haining, Zhejiang Province, which was accused of contaminat-
ing a nearby river and causing the high cancer rate of the village. Some violence 
occurred during the protest. The plant was ordered to suspend production until it 
constructed a proper waste-processing facility. 
18. The Haimen Case 
In December 2011, thousands of residents blocked the freeway in Haimen, Guang-
dong Province, to protest against a coal-fired power plant. Violence occurred in the 
confrontation with police. The project was temporarily suspended after the protest 
but was reportedly resumed later. 
19. The Shifang Case 
In July 2012, thousands of protesters against a local copper plant in Shifang, Sichuan 
Province, which was in its planning and early construction stage, stormed a govern-
ment building and smashed vehicles. Police reportedly shot tear gas and stun gre-
nades into the crowd. The local government then announced termination of the 
project’s construction. 
20. The Qidong Case 
In July 2012, thousands of citizens in Qidong, Jiangsu Province, took to the streets, 
demanding the cancellation of the Oji Paper Company’s pipeline project, which 
would dump industrial waste water into the neighboring sea. Protests ended after the 
government promised to permanently scrap the project.  
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$SSHQGL[ 'DWD0DWUL[
Row Case ID Conditions 
Out-
come 
  L V E S A O 
1 Xiamen 1 0 1 0 1 1 
2 Dalian 1 0 0 1 1 1 
3 Kunming 0 0 0 1 1 1 
4 Maoming 1 1 1 1 0 0 
5 Rushan 0 0 1 0 1 1 
6 Jiangmen 0 0 1 0 0 0 
7 Panyu 0 0 1 0 1 1 
8 Liulitun 0 0 1 0 1 1 
9 Gao’antun 0 0 0 1 1 1 
10 Asuwei 0 0 1 0 1 1 
11 Wujiang 1 0 1 0 0 0 
12 Tianjingwa 0 0 1 0 1 1 
13 Wuxi 1 1 0 0 0 0 
14 Beijing 0 0 1 0 1 1 
15 Shanghai 0 0 1 0 1 1 
16 Nanjing 0 0 1 0 1 1 
17 Haining 0 1 0 0 1 1 
18 Haimen 1 1 1 0 0 0 
19 Shifang 1 1 1 0 0 0 
20 Qidong 1 1 1 0 1 1 
1RWH / SURWHVWVFDOH9 SURWHVWIRUP( SURMHFWVWDJH6 FHQWUDOVXSSRUW$ SROLF\
DGYRFDF\2 RXWFRPHLHSROLF\FKDQJHLQHQYLURQPHQWDOJRYHUQDQFH
 
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$SSHQGL[ $QDO\VLVRI1HFHVVDU\&RQGLWLRQVIRUQR3ROLF\&KDQJH
Conditions Consistency Coverage 
L 0.83 0.63 
~L 0.17 0.08 
V 0.67 0.67 
~V 0.33 0.14 
E 0.83 0.33 
~E 0.17 0.20 
S 0.17 0.25 
~S 0.83 0.31 
A 0.00 0.00 
~A 1.00 1.00 
$SSHQGL[ $QDO\VLVRI6XIILFLHQW&RQGLWLRQVIRUQR3ROLF\&KDQJH
&RPSOH[6ROXWLRQ
 
Raw 
cov-
erage 
Unique 
coverage 
Con-
sistency
Cases 
~V*E*~S*~A 0.33 0.33 1 Jiangmen, Wujiang 
L*V*~S*~A 0.50 0.17 1 Wuxi, Haimen, Shifang
L*V*E*~A 0.50 0.17 1 Maoming, Haimen, Shifang 
solution  
coverage: 1     
solution  
consistency: 1     
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